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Introduction  
Southeast Asian Islam has recently been exposed to a problem of 
Islamic radicalism. Within the Southeast Asia region, the issue of 
Islamic radicalism has been given a wide coverage by media. A large 
percentage of the Muslim population of the world lives in this region, 
and thus Islamic radicalism is an issue of immense significance in the 
region. Certainly, al-Qaeda, which is regarded as the number one 
Islamic terrorist group in the world, is not based in the region. 
However, it has been suggested that al-Qaeda has links with other 
radical groups in the region —groups said to be responsible for the 
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bomb attacks in the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. 
Since Islamic radicalism has drawn the attention of the world, 
Southeast Asian Islam also becomes a subject of scholarly discussion. 
This paper examines Islamic radicalism particularly in Indonesia in 
terms of its roots and strategies of action. While focusing on the 
Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI, lit. “Islamic Community”) as the larger subject 
of discussion, it takes Ar Rahmah Media Network with its print 
publication of Jihad Magazine (Jihadmagz) in particular as the case of 
study. The paper argues that the emergence of Islamic radicalism is 
mainly triggered by the combination of the ruling regime’s political 
repression, crucial socio-economic deprivation, globalisation, and 
Arabia support. Also, it further argues that there is a shift of strategies 
among activists of radical Muslims in delivering their messages as well 
as in conducting their radical actions.  
To begin with, the paper explores the roots of Islamic radicalism in 
Indonesia. In what follows, it discusses the shift of local people’s 
perception of Islamic radicalism. Central to the discussion of this shift 
are the popular responses towards Islamic radicalism, particularly the 
issue of the existence of JI in Indonesia and the radical, violent actions 
by activists of this group. At the end, the paper investigates the diverse 
strategies the activists of radical Muslims shift from one time to 
another in delivering their messages to wider audience.  
The paper argues that Islamic radicalism is not a make-up story in 
Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia. In an earlier phase, it further 
argues, local people of the country split into diverse kinds of 
perception about Islamic radicalism. One striking perception was the 
doubt of the existence of radical Muslim groups, particularly JI. The 
success of the police in chasing the perpetrators of violent actions has 
then reduced the popular doubt, and made popular perception 
changed from doubt to how to save people from radical ideas of Islam. 
Despite this, in later development, the public gives an “excuse” to 
Islamic radicalism, some by responding to it in a fairly positive way. 
This later public response is partly a result of the diverse strategies of 
Islamic radical groups in delivering their messages to the public, 
consisting of physical action and publication.  
The Roots of Islamic Radicalism 
Islamic radicalism has strongly colored the picture of Islam in 
contemporary Indonesia. The face of Indonesian Islam is identified 
with some radical Muslims-based groups, such as Front Pembela Islam 
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(FPI, Islamic Defenders Front), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, 
Indonesian Mujahidin Council), Laskar Jihad (LJ, Jihad Paramilitary 
Troops), and Jama’ah Ikhwan al-Muslimun Indonesia (JAMI, 
Indonesian Ikhwan al-Muslimun Community). Even though Islamic 
radical groups do not have significant number in comparison with 
moderate ones, such as Nahdlatul Ulama’ (NU, The Awakening of 
Muslim Scholars) and Muhammadiyah, they can draw the popular 
attention.2 These groups are prominent in the contemporary 
Indonesian Islam for their literal religious understanding and radical 
actions.  
There are a lot of examples to show the radical actions of such 
groups. FPI has been involved in a number of raids and destruction of 
several cafés, discotheques, night clubs, gambling dens, and other 
socially “bad places”, just as LJ has had an intimate connection to the 
jihadist actions in Maluku, Ambon and Poso of Central Sulawesi. In 
these conflicting areas, LJ has sent its militias to fight against 
Christians. Meanwhile, the Amir Majlis (the leader of the advisory 
board) of MMI, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, is believed by such groups as 
Washington-based magazine, Time in its edition “Confession of an al-
Qaeda Terrorist”,3 Lee Kuan Yew in his address at the Conference on 
Asia Security by the International Institute for Strategic Studies,4 and 
above all by the US Bush administration, to be leading JI, a Muslim 
group believed to have networks throughout Southeast Asia, in 
particular Singapore and Malaysia, and to be allegedly linked to Al-
Qaeda. 
Much attention has been given to such Islamic radical groups. 
While MMI with Ba’asyir as its leader, as described by Huang,5 is 
allegedly responsible for the unsolved bombings in several places of 
Indonesia and the Philippines, LJ is believed to have played a 
significant role in the worsening of religious conflicts in several areas 
of Indonesia. Some commentators differently discern the involvement 
of LJ in such conflicts. Fealy notes that the sending of the Laskar 
                                                                
2 Azyumardi Azra, “Agama dan Otentisitas Islam,” Republika, 25 October 2002. 
3 See “Confession of an al-Qaeda Terrorist,” Time Magazine, 23 September 2002. 
4 Sidney Jones, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia 
(Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2002), p. 2. 
5 Reyko Huang, “Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia: Evidence and Response,” Terrorism 
Project, 8 February 2002, p. 1.   
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militias to the areas of conflict, particularly in Maluku, resulted from 
the low capacity of the state to end the conflict and from the finding 
suggesting that Muslims were to be driven out from the areas as 
Protestant churches had plans to build Christian state consisting of 
Maluku, West Papua and North Sulawesi.6 Unlike Fealy, Marshall 
regards LJ as the responsible for the aggravation of the conflicts. 
According to Marshall, LJ is the cause of the deterioration of the 
conflicts as the coming of LJ militias in Maluku and Sulawesi hindered 
the attempts of reconciliation between the conflicting groups. Marshall 
also points out that LJ had plans to drive out all Christians and to 
establish an extreme version of Islamic law, particularly in Sulawesi.7  
Such reported cases of Islamic radicalism might send a significant 
message that religious radicalism is frequently followed by violent 
actions. There is a parallel connection between religious radicalism and 
violence as the radicalism appears in the form of social resistance in 
accordance to its own religious understanding. There are, at least, three 
general tendencies of the radicalism. First, radicalism is perceived as a 
response towards the existing conditions, including assumption, idea, 
value, and institution regarded as deviant. Second, radicalism is not 
restricted to the form of such resistance, but also accompanied by an 
attempt to change the existing order with another one supposed to be 
better. Third, radicalism is equipped with a strong belief in a certain 
ideology and program, which can result in emotional reaction and 
violence.8 
Even though Islamic radicalism becomes a picture of 
contemporary Indonesian Islam, some commentators, while tending to 
come to the agreement that such Islamic radicalism is a new 
phenomenon for Indonesia, relate the phenomenon to the crisis 
suffered by the country. According to Hasan, Islamic radicalism, as a 
new phenomenon in Indonesia, is inseparable from the so-called multi-
                                                                
6 Greg Fealy, “Inside the Laskar Jihad: An Interview with the Leader of a New, Radical 
and Militant Sect,” Inside Indonesia (January-March 2001), available at: http://www. 
insideindonesia.org/edit65/fealy.htm (Cited 15/04/02).  
7 Paul Marshall, “Terror’s Not New to Indonesia,” Center for Religious Freedom, Freedom 
House (15 October 2002). Available at: [http://www.freedomhouse.org/religion/-
country/indonesia/Terror’s%20Not%20New%to%20Indonesia.htm] (Cited in 
14/11/02). 
8 Khamami Zada, “Terorisme dan Radikalisme Agama,” Media Indonesia, 18 Oktober 
2002.  
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dimensional crisis befalling the country since it started emerging in 
1997 when Soeharto’s regime was coming to the collapse. It seems to 
Hasan that Islamic radicalism had its moments when the country felt 
in the overwhelming crisis.9 In addition, Zada maintains that the fall of 
Soeharto provides Islamic radicalism with invaluable moments to 
accelerate its movement.10 The change of political leadership in 
Indonesia is likely to bring about the emergence of the alternative 
ideology in place of the previous one, and the ideology which seems to 
be more accurate to cover the movement of some contemporary 
Indonesian Muslims, according to Barton, is Islamism. The ideology 
which believes Islam can and should form the basis of political 
ideology, in Barton’s view,11 can be the beginning of Islamic radicalism.  
Certainly, the post-Soeharto era with its unsolved crises became a 
worthy moment for the emergence of Islamic radicalism. The 
phenomenon of Islamic radicalism became more visible in the post-
Soeharto era as the wide coverage of media towards their actions made 
their movements more influential. Van Bruinessen, while depicting 
Islamic radicalism as one of the most conspicuous new phenomena in 
contemporary Indonesian Islam, suggests that such Islamic radical 
groups had much power against the state authority at the time of the 
presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid. He gives an example that they 
often gained control of the streets under the unwillingness of the army 
and police to restrain them.12  
Such analyses on the emergence of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia 
play an important role in looking at the wider phenomena of Islamic 
radicalism across Southeast Asia as a whole, especially when it has 
been already found that some Islamic radicalism in the region have 
been interconnected. Indonesia which has been noted for long time as 
being occupied by Moderate Muslims, and has the world’s largest 
Muslim population, is now repeatedly claimed by several groups as a 
country with serious problems of Muslim terrorist and radical groups, 
                                                                
9 Noorhaidi Hasan, “Islamic Radicalism and the Crisis of the Nation-State,” Available 
at: http//www.isim.nl/newsletter/7/regional/1.html (Cited in 14/11/02).  
10 Khamami Zada, Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia 
(Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), 88. 
11 Greg Barton, “Islamism and Indonesia: Islam and the Contest for Power after 
Soeharto,” The Review (September 2002), p. 2. 
12 Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Soeharto 
Indonesia,” South East Asia Research, no. 2, vol. 10 (July 2002): p. 118. 
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particularly in the aftermath of bomb blast in sites such as Kuta Bali 
and Marriot Jakarta. As pointed out by Fealy,13 such countries as the 
US, Singapore and Malaysia claim to have evidence of Indonesians 
leading offshore terrorist groups or of terrorists being based in 
Indonesia, and moreover, Singaporean senior minister Lee Kwan Yew, 
as indicated by Tempo,14 claimed that Indonesia was a ‘hotbed of 
terrorism’. This intensifies the significance of analysis of why people 
become radicalised in the middle of the changing socio-political and 
economic situations within the course of the nation. 
Some commentators have different opinions on the problem of 
why people become radical individuals. According to general view of 
terrorism, as suggested by Ramakrishna,15 people become radicalised 
by a nexus of political repression and crucial socio-economic 
deprivation; or in other words, they become so if the government 
conducts repressive measures towards the protests and aspirations of 
the society while it fails to provide them with, not to mention all, 
economic growth, proper jobs, and affordable education. From this 
view, an understanding can be drawn that radicalism results from two 
key points: political suppression by the government and socio-
economic downturn.  
Such general view does not seem to be precisely the case in some 
Southeast Asian countries, however. Even though political repression 
and socio-economic decline have been the raison d’tre for the Islamic 
radicalism in Southeast Asia, there are other factors in the prevalence 
of radicalism: globalisation and Arabia. Islamic radicalism in Southeast 
Asia emerges, while in response to “political repression” and “poor 
governance”, as a result of the global awareness of Muslims in the 
region of the developments in the Islamic world, which creates anti-
American sentiment. Globalisation can be depicted as having poured 
more fuel on Islamic radicalism in Southeast Asia as Muslims of the 
region become aware that the problems facing the wider Islamic world 
resulting from a biased US foreign policy, while their national 
                                                                
13 Greg Fealy, “Is Indonesia a terrorist base?,” Inside Indonesia (July-September 2002), 
available at: http://www.insideindonesia.org/ edit71/fealy1.htm (Cited 19 November 
2002). 
14 “Diakah Sang Imam?,” Tempo (3 November 2002), p. 25.  
15 Kumar Ramakrishna, “Jemaah Islamiah: Aims, Motivations and Possible Counter-
Strategies,” Perspective (October 2002), p. 1. 
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governments have not done much to help change “Washington’s 
policy mind-set”.  
Thus, Islamic radicalism in Indonesia is given rise by four major 
factors: political repression, poor governance, global awareness, and 
Arabia. It is frequently argued, as reported by International Crisis 
Group (ICG) in its “Indonesia Briefing” section, that the New Order 
regime’s high suppression of political Islam contributed to the 
radicalisation of Muslim dissent.16 Moreover, the increase in Islamic 
radicalism is basically the outcome of the government failure to 
enforce the law and to solve socio-religious conflicts and the result of 
the abrupt decline of central government authority. Besides political 
struggle as well as poor governance as the roots, van Bruinessen adds 
that the present Islamic radicalism in Indonesia results also from global 
awareness, which paves the way for the establishment of transnational 
Islamic networks.17 In addition, Azra suggests that Islamic radicalism 
in Indonesia is closely related to the role of some Arab descendent 
figures in the groups of FPI, MMI, and LJ since they tend to take rigid 
and rigorous ways to come to their goals instead of persuasive and 
peaceful ones.18 Hefner admits that Islamic radicalism in Indonesia has 
come to its prominence with the significant contribution of financial 
assistance from Saudi Arabian authorities.19  
Meanwhile, in Singapore and Malaysia, political repression and 
socio-economic decline do not seem to be the key factors of the 
Islamic radicalism. This is not to say that political and socio-economic 
reasons are not the factors of Islamic radicalism in both countries, but 
rather that there is another factor to be more apparent for it. 
Ramakrishna maintains that the most important factor and very basic 
cause of Islamic radicalism, as represented by JI extremism, in 
Singapore and Malaysia are ideological, not socio-economic or 
political. All the 31 JI detainees in Singapore, according to 
Ramakrishna, are not “the children of poverty and despair”, but they 
                                                                
16 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Violance and Radical Muslims (Jakarta/Brussels: 
International Crisis Group, 10 October 2002), p. 3. 
17 van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism,” p. 118. 
18 Azra, “Agama dan Otentisitas Islam.”  
19 Robert W. Hefner, “Globalisation, Governance, and the Crisis of Indonesian 
Islam,” (Unpublished paper presented to the Conference on Globalisation, State 
Capacity, and Muslim Self Determination, Center for Global, International, and 
Regional Studies, University of California-Santa Cruz, 7-9 March 2002), p. 24. 
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are “gainfully employed” and own their homes encompassing HDB 
five-room or executive flats. In the matter of non-socio-economic and 
political factors of the Islamic radicalism in Malaysia, the roots can be 
traced to the background of its activists. Ramakrishna indicates that 
several leading activists of Islamic radical groups are the principals of 
schools, graduates and lecturers of universities.20 These kinds of job 
positions suggest a gainful employment, and show that the members of 
Islamic radicalism, who hold these job positions, occupy an upper level 
in the community in terms of the socio-economic status.  
From the phenomenon of the Islamic radicalism in Indonesia, 
there is one significant feature that Islamic radicalism does not appear 
from zero point or without any affiliation to the others. Van 
Bruinessen maintains that Islamic radical groups in Indonesia can be 
traced to two roots: national and transnational networks.21 While 
national network refers to two relatively “indigenous” previous Muslim 
political movements, the Darul Islam (DI) movement and the 
Masyumi Party, transnational network relates to a number of such 
more recent transnational Islamic links as the sponsor groups, which 
are identified by van Bruinessen22 with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and 
Pakistan. 
From such a perspective, the DI movement and the Masyumi 
Party have inspired the activists of current Islamic Radicalism in 
Indonesia, and thus have occupied a certain place in their hearts. 
Having been ordered to dissolve itself in early 1960s, according to van 
Bruinessen23 and ICG,24 Masyumi transformed its political struggle 
then into, one of the things, the missionary efforts among Indonesian 
Muslims under the name of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia 
(DDII, the Indonesian Dakwah Council) in 1967. The two prominent 
figures, which are claimed to be leading JI, Ba’asyir and Sungkar, are 
indicated by van Bruinessen to be well connected to DDII circles.25 
Van Bruinessen also indicates that one of the most active Islamic 
radical groups, MMI, in which Ba’asyir used to occupy the position of 
                                                                
20 Ramakrishna, “Jemaah Islamiah,” pp. 1-3. 
21 van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism, p. 118. 
22 Ibid., p. 149. 
23 Ibid., p. 122. 
24 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Violance and Radical Muslims, p. 11. 
25 van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism, p. 129. 
  
Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia 
9 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 08, Number 01, June 2014 
leadership, encompasses the sections of the DI movement of the 
foregoing decades.26 Hefner also points out that among those in MMI 
organisation’s rank are individuals associated with the DI group.27 The 
connection of the alleged terrorist organisation, JI, to the DI 
movement, according to Jones,28 has gained justification from the 
intimate relationship between Ba’asyir and Sungkar and Kadungga, a 
son in law of Kahar Muzakkar, the leader of DI movement in South 
Sulawesi.  
In sum, globalisation has met with localisation (“glocalisation”) to 
become two contributing factors for Islamic radicalism in Southeast 
Asia. Globalisation has raised the awareness of Muslims of the global 
situation facing Islamic world. This awareness has generated Muslims’ 
reaction to the existing situations they face, using lots of their possible 
religious and financial resources. This condition has been devastated 
by the reduced capacity of the state where Muslims stay in, coupled 
with socio-economic downturn, to deal with radicalism and violation 
within the country.  
The Unresolved Jama’ah Islamiyah as a Radical Group 
Jama’ah Islamiyah is claimed to be an organisation with an ultimate 
goal of establishing a great Islamic state in Southeast Asia. As a result 
of the alleged Indonesian Muslim figures behind JI, the issue of JI in 
Indonesia has become the subject of wide debate. The Indonesian 
prominent figures are suspected of having leading roles in the 
organisation, and thus JI is presumably thought to exist in Indonesia. It 
was not until the end of 2003 that commentaries on the issue can be 
classified into having two approaches. The first approach sees that JI 
really exists in Indonesia, just as the second approach views that JI in 
Indonesia is only a fictitious organisation blown up by the political 
campaign of other countries. Both approaches have their own 
rationale, and thus they give rise to different consequences in terms of 
analysis of the alleged terrorist group, JI.  
The approach, which sees that JI has really a presence in 
Indonesia, relates the emergence of JI to the auspices of the 
                                                                
26 Ibid., p. 144. 
27 Hefner, “Globalisation, Governance, and the Crisis,” p. 21. 
28 As quoted in “Sidney Jones: Hambali Adalah Petinggi Al-Qaidah,” Tempo (3 
November 2002), p. 53; “Jejak Ba’asyir di Sungai Manggis,” Tempo (3 November 2002), 
p. 28. 
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Indonesian military. One of the proponents of this approach, Sidney 
Jones says that JI in Indonesia, which is allegedly responsible for 
several terrorist acts in Southeast Asia, was established by the 
Indonesian military in the beginning of the 1970s. The establishment 
of this organisation, according to Sidney Jones, was mainly to 
accommodate the political interests of Muslims in the era of Soeharto, 
and at the same time to manipulate it as a ‘rubberstamp’ for labelling 
any Islamic movement fundamentalist groups. With this labelling, the 
government had a reason then, as indicated by Sidney Jones, to 
eradicate and combat the movements that allegedly bring a danger to 
the country.29  
The evidence exploited by such an approach to convince the 
existence of JI in Indonesia is taken from the District court 
documents, from which the term “Jama’ah Islamiyah” was found in 
Indonesia for the first time. As explicitly suggested by Sidney Jones, 
the term “Jama’ah Islamiyah” did not appear until to be found in the 
court documents from the 1980s, one of the things is the Sleman 
District document under the title “Berkas Perkara Tersangka Abdullah 
Sungkar [Case Document of the Alleged Abdullah Sungkar]”.30 
However, according to Tempo, there is another court document found 
earlier than the document of Sungkar’s trial to support the claim of the 
presence of JI in Indonesia. This document is the Medan District 
Court document of 1978 on charges of Gaos Taufik, the leader of 
Komando Jihad (Jihad Command), which states, as reported by Tempo, 
that Taufik had taken Abdullah Umar’s oath of loyalty to the JI in 
establishing a state based on Islamic law.31 From this evidence, it is 
clearly shown that the term “Jama’ah Islamiyah” is acknowledged for 
the first time through the documents of the court, which contain 
charges on the alleged figures of Islamic radicalism.  
                                                                
29 As quoted in “Jemaah Islamiyah Dibentuk oleh Militer Indonesia?,” 13 August 2002, 
available at: [http://www.detik.com/peristiwa/2002/08/13/20020813-055812.shtml] 
(Cited 06/11/02).  
30 In this document, it is told the term “Jama’ah Islamiyah” comes from Abdullah 
Sungkar. He used the term to call his organisation. Sungkar informed the court that as 
he received information from newspapers that the members of Jama’ah Islamiyah have 
been detained in Medan, he was certain to go to Pondok Ngruki for security reason. 
See Sidney Jones, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia 
(Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2002), pp. 5-6.  
31 See “Diakah Sang Imam?,” p. 25. 
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A criticism has been directed, however, towards such an approach. 
The evidence to show the existence of JI solely through the court 
document without any sufficient investigation towards political 
atmosphere of the time is believed to be misleading. Supriyono, a 
senior journalist of the Indonesian daily newspaper, Republika, criticises 
such an approach, saying that the allegation of JI to exist in Indonesia 
based only upon the finding of the term “Jama’ah Islamiyah” from the 
court document of the trial process of Abdullah Sungkar needs to be 
further investigated as the emergence of the term resulted only from 
the indictments of the prosecutor in later 1970s and early 1980s. Any 
reference to the political cases of Muslims at this period, according to 
Supriyono, must be carefully conducted with an analytically close and 
careful observation of the political relations of Islam and the state in 
which the New Order regime conducted very strong political 
repression on Muslims. Under this political repression, what to be the 
indictment of the prosecutor, as apparent in other cases, is likely to be 
also what to be the scenario of the state intelligence body. The trial of 
Abdullah Sungkar at this period went under this situation with the 
result that the term “Jama’ah Islamiyah”, as indicated by Supriyono, 
might appear in Sungkar’s confession under the direction of the 
intelligence body.32  
Meanwhile, the approach, which views that JI in Indonesia is only 
a fictitious organisation, relates the issue to the familiarity of its name 
and the political campaign of other countries. Some Indonesian 
commentators tend to follow this approach, maintaining that as a 
Muslim organisation, JI is not well acknowledged by Indonesians; most 
Indonesians having no prior knowledge of the existence of this 
organisation. Alfitra Salamm, a researcher from LIPI (Lembaga Ilmu 
Pengetahuan Indonesia/Indonesian Institute of Science), for example, 
states that JI is not a real, but only a fictitious organisation set up by 
Malaysia and Singapore governments to silence the criticism of Islamic 
radical groups in their respective countries.33  
                                                                
32 As quoted in Institut Studi Arus Informasi (ISAI), “Liputan Media Tentang Bali: 
Mana Jurnalisme Mana Propaganda?,” (Seminar Proceeding by ISAI and Majalah 
Pantau, Jakarta, 7-8 November 2002).  
33 As quoted in “Peneliti LIPI: JI Organisasi Maya Buatan Malaysia dan Singapura,” 
Detikcom, available at: [http://www.detik.com/peristiwa/2002/10/30/20021030-0654-
21.shtml] (Cited in 06/11/02); “Jamaah Islamiyah yang Cuma Bualan,” Forum Keadilan, 
No. 3 (10 November 2002): p. 16 
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Certainly, if the parameter used to relate the organisation of JI in 
Southeast Asia to Indonesian figures is only based on the government 
claims and the confession of detainees, several Indonesian figures are 
the subjects of such allegations. In Malaysia, for example, JI, as 
reported by The Malay Mail, was claimed to be established by two 
Indonesian clerics, Ba’asyir and Riduan a.k.a. Isamuddin Hambali at 
the time of their status of exile in Malaysia. JI is allegedly to exist 
through the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM), an organisation 
regarded, according to The Malay Mail, as the offshoot or the local 
branch of the JI, which had plans to establish a pan-Islamic state 
including Indonesia, Singapore, southern Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Brunei.34 The allegation of there being links between KMM and JI has 
also been made by the Singapore government. According to Fealy, like 
in Malaysia, officials in Singapore claimed there were links between the 
two organisations. This allegation was followed by the arrestment of 
several figures in the period of mid 2001 to early 2002.35 All the 
detainees, according to Internal Security Department (ISD) of 
Singapore, confessed that such four Indonesian Muslim figures as 
Ba’asyir, Hambali, Abu Jibril or Mohammad Iqbal bin Abdul Rahman, 
and Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana are their JI leaders.36 
The public doubt about the existence of JI as a radical Islamic 
group in Indonesia has been decreased since the end of 2003. Since 
then, the issue has been no longer about whether or not JI exists in 
Indonesia. Rather, public debate goes to an issue of how to 
deradicalise the communities, or how to secure people from radical 
ideas of Islam. This shift of public discourse is a result of the success 
of the police in proving allegations against Imam Samudra, Amrozi, 
and Ghufron as the masterminds of the 2002 Bali Bombing. The 
public goes further to be less doubtful of the existence of JI in 
Indonesia following the execution of these three Bali bombers on 9 
November 2008. 
Another factor of the lessening of the public doubt about the 
existence of JI as a radical group in Indonesia is the actions by its 
                                                                
34 “Bali Bombings: Mastermind with Local Links,” The Malay Mail (19 November 
2002), available at: [http://www.mmail.com.my/Current_News/MM/Monday/Front-
page/20021118094632] (Cited 19/11/02). 
35 Fealy, “Is Indonesia a terrorist base?,” p. 1.  
36 “Stemple JI dari Singapura,” Tempo (10 November 2002), p. 37; “Jejak Ba’asyir di 
Sungai Manggis,” Tempo (3 November 2002), p. 30. 
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activists which have manifested in different ways. Their actions are 
varied from physical to ideological, which eventually show their 
energetic activism in the public. As elaborated below, the activists of 
this radical group have implemented different strategies in sending 
their messages to the general public audience, from physical attacks to 
publication, and then from publication to another kind of physical 
action. The media widely covered what the activists of this radical 
group have conducted in their presence in the public sphere. As a 
consequence, public attention has been bombarded with the energetic 
activism of the proponents of this radical group along with other wings 
of the radical Muslims. The actions of the radical Muslim activists 
have, in due course, attracted public attention.  
Even though the number of radical Muslims remains small in 
Indonesia compared to that of moderate Muslims, the popular 
perception about their way of distributing their messages through 
physical actions needs a thorough analysis. This is because people, as a 
recent survey reported by Kompas suggests, do not intend to be entirely 
opposed to radical Muslims’ actions. The survey is so illustrative as 
follows: 
Table 1: Perception of Terrorism  
Items of Perception %  
Supporting suicide bombing as part of jihad   18.1% 
Favouring Amrozi’s and Samudera’s way of physical action as a 
required jihad 
6.7% 
Agreeing, Osama-led al-Qaedah’s strategies against US need full 
supports 
59.1% 
Agreeing for physical attacks against the Kuffar for da’wah 
purposes 
30.5% 
Source : a research presented by Nasaruddin Umar (Director General of 
Guidance for Muslims, MORA), to the Conference on Counter-
Terrorism in Nusa Dua, Bali, as quoted in “Penanggulangan 
Terorisme: Mulailah dari Komunitas Terkecil,” Kompas (22 October 
2010).  
Such a range of perception seems to result particularly from 
strategies developed by the activists of radical Muslim groups. What 
has been conducted by JI activists need to be the case of analysis in 
grasping a better sense of the diverse strategies of these groups. 
Activists from these groups develop different strategies, from physical 
action to publication, and from publication to another physical action. 
These strategies add new types to a common strategy previously 
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developed from oral preaching to physical action. The following 
subsection particularly discusses two strategies, from physical action to 
publication, and from publication to another physical action.   
Ar Rahmah Media Network: From Physical Action to 
Publication 
Jihadmagz is a bimonthly Islamic magazine established by Ar 
Rahmah Media Network, based initially in Pamulang and currently in 
Bintaro, Tangerang, Banten. Owned and managed by Muhammad 
Jibriel Abdul Rahman (more popularly known as Jibriel), Ar Rahmah 
Media Network is itself a publishing house with a huge production of 
jihad-oriented publications. It produces these publications in an active 
way in Indonesia so that people can easily find its products, from 
pamphlets, books, video CDs, to magazines, in the market. Its success 
in producing jihad-oriented publications has inspired other publishing 
houses, such as Muqowama and Bumi Karya Media, to follow its 
example.37  
Jihadmagz was first launched on 1 March 2008 during the 7th 
Islamic Book Fair in Istora Senayan, Jakarta. It was launched by two 
leading jihad activists in Indonesia and the wider Southeast Asia 
region, Ba’asyir and Muhammad Iqbal Abdul Rahman alias Fihiruddin 
(more popularly known as “Abu Jibriel”). Ba’asyir was himself 
previously the amir or top leader of the MMI and recently the amir of 
Jama’ah Anshorut Tauhid (literally “the community of defenders of 
Islamic theology”). As his name indicates, Abu Jibriel is, in reality, the 
father of Jibriel, the owner as well as executive director of the 
magazine.  
Jihadmagz is an attractively printed Islamic magazine which pays 
special attention to the raising of the issue of jihad among local 
communities in Indonesia. It is second to none amongst Islamic 
magazines specialising in the dissemination of jihad ideas with its 
strong accentuation and orientation towards the raising of Muslims’ 
religious-ideological awareness of waging physical war against the West 
and the infidels. The wording of the advertisement for its launching 
even claimed that it was “the first jihad magazine in the world”.  
                                                                
37 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Publishing Industry, Asia Report 
No.147/28 February 2008 (Jakarta & Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2008), p. 
10. 
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Some comparison can be made between Jihadmagz with other 
Islamic magazines with a similar ideological bent such as Khilafah 
Magazine (more commonly referred to as K-Mag) and An-Najah. K-Mag 
is published by the Bogor-based Pustaka Thariqul ‘Izzah. An-Najah is 
published by the Solo-based Forum Studi Islam An-Najah (An-Najah 
Forum for Islamic Studies). In the eyes of these latter two magazines, 
the idea of jihad does not refer to the sense of physical jihad or 
physical war against the West and the infidels. Jihadmagz, however, 
strongly and staunchly promotes these ideas, as elaborated below.38  
The establishment of Jihadmagz marks a new trend in public 
expression among the Islamic jihadist movement in Indonesia, from 
physical actions on the ground to publications. In the past, jihad 
activists had long been concerned with involving themselves in 
physical action against Westerners and non-believers. The Ambon 
conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims in the period 1999-2002 
was an example of involvement in jihad activism, which was later 
reproduced in the forms of a video CD. Recently, they reoriented their 
activism from physical action on the ground of conflict areas to print 
publication. This reorientation is due partly to the anti-terrorism 
campaign conducted energetically by the government. The production 
of Jihadmagz is a striking example of this reorientation.  
The phenomenon of the growing interest among jihad activists in 
print publication can be taken as another kind of obvious evidence to 
support the argument that print publication has a comparative 
advantage in constructing a certain ideological belief among the 
people. Through print publication, people not only can discover ideas 
and views of Islam, but also can reflect upon their meanings. This 
opportunity for reflection allows people not only to have a better grasp 
of Islamic ideas or views, but also to obtain a deep understanding of 
both emotional and doctrinal aspects of those Islamic ideas or views. 
So, the interplay between print publication and consumers works well. 
Print publication extends itself to attract not only its own captive 
audience but also the non-captive audience. It is one reason that print 
publication not only accommodates the market but also creates a new 
market or audience.  
                                                                
38 It is in this strong and steadfast sense of jihad that the claim made by ICG that there 
were already several jihad magazines preceding Jihadmagz in Indonesia, including An-
Najah, is baseless. For more information about the ICG’s claim, see International 
Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Publishing, p. 10. 
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The concept of “jihad media” promoted by Ar Rahmah Media 
Network and exemplified by Jihadmagz cannot be separated from the 
activism of Jibriel himself (b. 1984). Jibriel is the oldest of the eleven 
children of Muhammad Iqbal Abdul Rahman alias Fihiruddin alias 
“Abu Jibriel”. Abu Jibriel is himself a prominent jihad activist who 
lived for many years in Malaysia with other da`wah and jihad activists 
such as Abdullah Sungkar and Ba’asyir.39  
Jibriel’s partnership with Agus Suhendra and M. Fachry 
contributed to the further development of Jihadmagz and other 
products of so-called “jihad media” by Ar Rahmah Media Network. 
Suhendra was working for a distributing company of Hollywood 
movies based in the Mangga Dua Complex, Central Jakarta. Fachry 
was a senior editor of the well-established Islamic book publishing 
house with a strict-conservative ideology, GIP. Jibriel gained 
knowledge relating to marketing, circulating, and distributing the 
products of jihad media from Suhendra. Likewise, he obtained similar 
knowledge of editorship matters from Fachry. In organising Ar Rahma 
Media Network in general and Jihadmagz in particular, Jibriel serves as 
the idea creator in addition to his capacity as the owner and as the 
executive director, just as Suhendra and Fachry are respectively the 
marketing manager and editor-in-chief.40 
The establishment and early operation of Jihadmagz resulted initially 
from self-funding in the sense of personal financing by Jibriel’s family, 
and was later supported by financial sources with no usury principles. 
As Jibriel points out, the financial source for the establishment and 
initial operation of Jihadmagz was his father, Abu Jibriel. The so-called 
“social trust” Jibriel obtained from the printing company and his Ar 
Rahmah crews, allowing for delayed payment for production cost and 
job salary, is another kind of so-called “initial capital”. Jihadmagz also 
took much advantage of other financial sources. Since it considers 
usury as haram (legally unjustifiable), the magazine made use of 
financial support from individuals in Jakarta as the additional capital 
under the economic model of mudarabah (“profit-sharing”).41 So, 
                                                                
39 Ibid., p. 10. 
40 Interviews with Jibriel, Istora Senayan, Jakarta, 04 March 2008; Jibriel, Bintaro, 
Tangerang, Banten, 25 April 2008. 
41 Interview with Jibriel, Bintaro, Tangerang, Banten, 25 April 2008. By definition, 
mudarabah is a principle or an arrangement for a business contract between two parties, 
the first as the investor (sahib al-mal) and the other as the entrepreneur (mudarib), which 
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Jihadmagz relied more on individual rather than institutional sources 
such as banks for supporting its operation.  
Jihadmagz is oriented to middle-class consumers, allowing for 
greater impact. The reason, according to the magazine, is that the 
middle class has an important role in leading change. By segmenting 
this market level, the ideas of jihad can be more easily disseminated 
and imparted to society.42 For this reason, production of Jihadmagz is 
exclusive. The magazine is produced in full colour and hard paper. It 
sells at an expensive price, Rp. 45,000, in comparison to other well-
established news magazines such as Tempo which sells for Rp. 22,500.  
For marketing purposes, the exploitation of jihad ideas and 
practices as materials for publication by Jihadmagz is not without 
reason. Especially during the global campaign against (Islamic) 
terrorism and the jihadist movement, people around the world kept an 
eye on the jihad movement in every single part of the globe. Indonesia 
was no exception. Especially following Bali Bombing I which killed no 
less than 202 people and injured hundreds of others, the Bali Bombing 
II (1 October 2005) with 23 dead and 196 injured, and the Kuningan 
Bombing in Jakarta (9 September 2004) which killed 9 people and 
injured more than 100 others, some repressive political measures by 
the government have been taken against the militant da`wah-cum-jihad 
movement across Indonesia. These repressive political measures have 
been actively conducted under the auspices or supports of foreign 
governments such as those of Australia and the US.43  
Under such a difficult situation, not only did those militant da`wah-
cum-jihad activists modify and diversify their activities into various 
forms such as publications, but other Muslims, especially harakah 
activists, also started to seek for more information about the 
“fundamentalist-militant-jihadist-hardliner” Islamic movement. As a 
result, an Islamic magazine publication focusing on this 
“fundamentalist-militant-jihadist-hardliner” Islamic ideology began to 
emerge and attract popular attention. Jihadmagz captured this situation 
as the potential market for its publications. It appears consistent with, 
                                                                                                                                      
requires profit and loss sharing to be determined during the agreement of the contract. 
For more information, see Muhammad Ayub, Understanding Islamic Finance (Hoboken: 
John Wiley & Sons, 2007), pp. 320-328. 
42 Interview with Jibriel, Bintaro, Tangerang, Banten, 25 April 2008. 
43 See, for example, AusAID, Counter-Terrorism and Australian Aid (Canberra: 
AusAID/Australian Government, 2003), especially p. 6.  
  
Akh. Muzakki 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 08, Number 01, June 2014 
18 
and committed to, the production and dissemination of this Islamic 
ideology within its publications throughout this time.  
In the market, in fact, Jihadmagz performs quite well. The first issue 
in March 2008, for example, was produced in 5,000 copies, but sold 
within less than two months 4,000 copies.44 As a newly established 
Islamic magazine in a period of increasingly tight market competition, 
Jihadmagz can be regarded as highly saleable. In comparison, Madina, a 
Jakarta-based Islamic magazine established a year earlier than 
Jihadmagz, is printed in as many as six to eight thousand copies per 
issue, but sells on an average only 35 percent of the whole volume of 
production for each edition.45 Even though it is a newly established 
magazine, Jihadmagz has performed well with high saleability in the 
market. 
Renewal Strategy: From Publication to another Physical Action 
Another reorientation of public expressions by radical Muslims 
emerges when they feel confident enough with their own 
organisational plans. This reorientation leads them to shift from the 
making use of publication as a means of their meaning-making and 
message-producing to another kind of physical action. This shift of 
strategy seems to be implemented following the continuing 
consolidation among the activists of radical Muslim groups during the 
so-called “ceasefire” period where publication becomes a key 
instrument one the one hand, and as a response to the detaining of 
several radical Muslim activists on the other hand. 
One of the most striking examples which can be taken as evidence 
to mark the shift of strategy from publication to another physical 
action is the robbing of CIMB Niaga Bank in Medan on 18 August 
2010. This rob action has fuelled the war against the radical Muslim 
activists by the police. Attempts by the police to chase the culprits of 
the bank rob has been undertaken in areas in Sumatra ranging from 
Medan to other provinces, and even to other provinces including Java. 
From the perspective of the police investigation, several figures alleged 
to have been responsible for the bank rob in question are activists 
having close relationship with JI-affiliated individuals. Some, in the 
eyes to the police, are part of the terorism network with a number of 
jihadist training experiences held in Aceh and West Java. They are 
                                                                
44 Interview with Jibriel, Bintaro, Tangerang, Banten, 25 April 2008. 
45 Correspondence with Ade Armando, the editor-in-chief of Madina, 15 July 2008. 
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under the coordination of Mustofa (better known as Abu Tholut). Abu 
Tholut was himself put in jail for four years and half long for terrorism 
acts. After his release, he was believed by the police to be involved 
again in the fields of terrorism. He was then captured by anti-terrorism 
police force of Densus 88 in Kudus, Central Java, on 10 December 
2010 for being suspected to have a connection to the perpetrators of 
the CIMB Niaga Bank robbers in Medan.  
Such a reorientation from publication to another kind of physical 
action adds another kind to the strategies developed by radical 
Muslims in contemporary period in Indonesia. As suggested earlier, in 
the past, jihad activists had long been concerned with involving 
themselves in physical action against Westerners and non-believers. In 
other words, physical action represents the early strategy exploited in 
their public expression. In later development, jihad activists made use 
of publication as an additional means for meaning-making and 
message-producing.  
The phenomenon of the growing interest among jihad activists in 
shifting the strategy from publication to another physical action can be 
taken as another kind of obvious evidence to support the argument 
that Islamic radicalism is not a make-up story. The using of diverse 
strategies is just to show that they exist among communities. These 
different strategies just follow the growing socio-political situation of 
the country and the maturity of the consolidation results among the 
radical jihadist activists.  
Conclusion 
The phenomenon of Islamic radicalism has been quite prominent 
in the regional development of Southeast Asia, particularly in 
Indonesia. As a result, Indonesia turns to be the subject of the 
allegation of the hotbed of radicalism and terrorism. Four factors have 
contributed to the rise of Islamic radicalism In Indonesia, including the 
regime’s political repression, crucial socio-economic deprivation, 
globalisation, and the so-called “Arabia” support. Also, in this country 
Islamic radicalism appears in connection to two main roots: national 
roots tracing back to the previous Islamic movement and party in the 
early history of Indonesia, and transnational networks referring to a 
number of recent transnational Islamic links as the sponsor groups. 
The diverse strategies developed by activists of Muslims radical 
groups contribute to the expansion of ideas distribution to wider 
audience. The reason is that people are given more opportunity to 
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reflect upon the meaning of the action conducted by activists of radical 
Muslim groups, either through publication or physical action. As a 
result, even though their involvement in physical attacks against other 
people remains a public concern, popular Muslims’ perception about 
the activism of radical Muslims do not entirely tend to be in opposition 
to the deadly physical attacks most likely conducted by jihad activists. 
This kind of perception can be assumed to be a consequence of the 
energetic activism of those radical Muslims exploiting such different 
strategies.  
Such a kind of public perception proves to have led to the shift of 
popular understanding about Islamic radicalism from the doubt of the 
existence of one of its wings, JI, to the increasingly positive responses 
towards the struggles of radical Muslims. Rather than maintaining their 
doubt of the existence of JI, people start to formulate their ideas to 
deal with the struggles of Islamic radicalism. The bombardment of 
information and messages through such different strategies 
(publication and physical action) has imparted a message to the public 
that JI, and other radical Muslim groups, has attracted popular 
attention, and hence becomes a popular concern. Global geopolitics 
and the increasing conservative understanding of Islamic doctrines of 
jihad pose a new subject of study, and therefore deserve a thorough 
analysis in order to get a better comprehension of such a growing 
public perception. Kinds of research on these two issues appear to be 
significant to undertake. [] 
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